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Abstract 
Modern science and its underlying philosophical doctrine, physicalism, have 
persistently denied reality to a set of phenomena they refer to as "paranormal". 
However, belief in the occurrence of these events is common to many non-Western 
cultures. This essay addresses the question of the reality of these events and 
advance the view that science, on its own methodology, can neither sustain the 
denial of their reality nor justify its rejection of the "paranormal" as sources of 
knowledge. 
1. Introduction 
This paper attempts a critical review of the dismemberment by physical 
science and its underlying philosophical doctrines of the set of phenomena 
referred to as "paranormal". A widely accepted definition of a "paranormal" event 
is that which seems to contradict the fundamental ideas and principles upon which 
modem science has been based (Mosleyl978: 9). Belief in the occurrence of these 
events is common to many non-Western cultures, yet their ontological status and, 
with it, the question of whether they can be legitimate sources of knowledge 
has occasioned academic debate since the end of the nineteenth century1• All 
subscribers to physicalism, the ontological and epistemological framework which 
sustains mainstream Western science, have persisted in their denial of existence to 
these phenomena and the claims to knowledge made by their advocates. This essay 
will address the question of the reality of 'paranormal' events and defend the thesis 
that they are real and can furnish us with legitimate knowledge. Therefore science, 
on its own methodology, cannot sustain the denial ofreality to the 'paranormal'. 
Nor is the rejection of the 'paranormal' as sources of knowledge methodologically 
tenable. 
Toward this, we expound indigenous African ontological and 
epistemological concepts to explain the 'paranormal'. The physical scientist who 
denies paranormal phenomena must provide better explanations than those offered 
by indigenous African knowledge systems. We claim, further, that the principles 
underlying the methods of scientific practice, interpreted more broadly than that 
commonly understood in the West, are embedded in the philosophies of many 
traditional African cultures, and that certain African indigenous concepts become 
viable scientific postulates for the explanation of the "paranormal". "Sunsum" an 
Akan ontologico-epistemological concept is a viable "scientific" postulate for the 
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explanation of the 'paranormal'. Therefore, broadening the methodology of science to 
embrace the procedures that traditional African thinkers employ for the investigation 
ofnature can make meaningful contributions to the search for knowledge and truth. 
The argument for the broadening of the methodology of conventional 
science speaks to the need to take African, Latin American, Asian and Australasian 
indigenous knowledge systems seriously. Our discussion falls accordingly within 
the general context of indigenous knowledge systems and, in particufar African 
indigenous knowledge systems with particular reference to Akan cosmology. 
It is not our intention to engage in an elaborate disquisition on the meaning 
of the phrase, African indigenous knowledge systems. Although such a special 
discussion is scientifically apposite, we shall content ourselves with the acceptation 
that the phrase refers to the knowledge, beliefs and cultures of peoples whose 
ways of knowing and acting were and, continue to be systematically discarded 
- in the name of "science" and "civilization" - from the global construction of 
"scientific" knowledge. 
2. Occurrence of the "Paranormal": Myth and Reality 
The founding of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) in London 
in 1882 is often taken to mark the first effort in the Western world to address 
the questiop. of the occurrence of paranormal phenomena scientifically. The 
Society undertook tc;> "investigate, among other things, the alleged acquisition of 
knowledge without the use of any known sense organ" (Mundie 1967: 49-50), and 
the commonest term given to the kind of information identified for investigation 
on the agenda of the SPR is Extra-Sensory Perception (ESP) or Paranormal 
Cognition (PNC). 
The terminologies employed by the Society in defining the subject of 
investigation are instructive on the skepticism about the occurrence of such 
phenomena. The empiricist stance permeates the terminologies. The aim of the 
society suggests clearly that the sense organs (and elliptically the pure activity of 
the mind processing the impressions of the sense organs) constitute the pathways 
to the acquisition of a class of knowledge about which there is no allegation of 
unreality. These then, by implication, must be the normal pathways to knowledge. 
There is, with this, the implication of the existence of a possible category of 
knowledge, that which is alleged to exist para the normal, and whose status must 
be judged according to the standards that determine the normal. Embedded in this 
conception is that the events which are para the normal can never fully coincide 
with normal events. 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that this prejudgment in defining the 
research tasks of the society have provided a conceptual background that excluded 
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and clouded alternative viewpoints and nourished the self-assurance of critics of 
the paranormal. This is the reason why we use the term "paranormal" in quotation 
marks. 
Experimental study of the "paranormal" has since then been the approach 
of parapsychology or psychical research, and by the 1940s, experimental study 
had accumulated enormous evidence for the occurrence of such phenomena in 
Europe and America (Carrington 1945; Johnson 1955; Rhine 1934; Schmidt 1969; 
Stanford 1978; Tyrell 1953). The researchers identified two broad categories of 
"paranormal" events. These are. Paranormal Cognition (PNC) or Extra-Sensory 
Perception (ESP), on the one hand, and Psychokinesis on the other. 
They distinguished four main sub-species of PNC, the first of which 
is telepathy, a term they employed to refer to the communication between one 
mind and another without the use of the recognized channels of sense. In ordinary 
parlance, we identify telepathic ability as the ability to 'read someone's mind'. 
Next is clairvoyance. This refers to the mind's ability to acquire knowledge of 
physical objects or events extra-sensorially. An example of clairvoyant ability 
would be X's ability to state accurately the contents of a closed briefcase that he 
encounters for the first time. Precognition, the third species of PNC, refers to the 
ability to acquire fore-knowledge of events without the use of recognized sensory 
channels; and finally retrocognition refers to the non-inferential cognition of 
events in the past, verified later, which are outside the range of a person's memory 
(Johnson 1955: 9 - 57). 
On the other hand, all the phenomena in which the mind is deemed to 
have extra-sensorial powers of action in the world constitute psychokinesis. The 
most important sub-species of this, for our purposes, is witchcraft, since this 
constitutes a good portion of the belief in the "paranormal" in Africa. Witchcraft 
can be defined as an innate power which can be used by its possessor to influence 
events in the world from any distance (Oluwole 1995: 366). 
3. Skepticism of the "Paranormal" 
In spite of the available evidence of experimental research, subscribers to 
physicalism, the philosophical doctrine underlying the physical sciences, have 
deployed diverse claims to discredit the findings of psychical researchers and 
condescend on the conclusions of non-western cultures that maintain the occurrence 
of events that do not easily lend themselves to the explanatory framework of 
physicalism. Most of this skepticism can be brought under four main categories. 
(a) Accidental occurrence 
Perhaps the most common of these is the chance hypothesis. This is the claim that 
"paranormal" events have occurred by persistent accident. This, of course, is a 
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self-refuting argument for the champion of this hypothesis because an accidental 
event is an event, and one counter-instance is sufficient to defeat pretences of 
universalism. Besides, the chance hypothesis amounts to the claim that evidence 
stretching through varied conditions in different cultures over a wide range of 
subjects at different times is fortuitous and therefore unreasonable. 
These notwithstanding, sufficient documentation exist to prove the 
conformity of the methods of psychical researchers with established scientific 
methods of experiment and analysis of testimony. To ensure the validity of their 
findings, the psychical researchers employed the mathematical evaluative principle 
of probability, and their calculations of chance, from the 1920s onwards, fulfill the 
requirements for general practice among statisticians (Rhine 1934: 150). In 1937, 
the American Institute of Mathematical Research affirmed that these statistical 
analyses were essentially valid (Mundie 1967: 55), and recent meta-analysis of 
these findings supports this (Utts 1991 ). What these mean is that scientific method 
has established the occurrence of these events. Consequently, pleading the chance 
hypothesis, by employing scientific methods as the measure of the reality (i.e. 
the non-chance occurrence) of a phenomenon, leads to inconsistency and cannot 
therefore stand. 
Once the chance hypothesis is ruled out further questions arise regarding 
human reliability. These are whether we can vouch for the sincerity and 
competence of the researchers, and if yes whether loopholes may have existed in 
their techniques that might annul their conclusions? 
(b) Sincerity 
The subject of sincerity requires very little in answer. Psychical research, like 
most academic pursuits, is primarily a quest for truth about nature which, for many 
decades, was pursued by "several university departments in most of the [western] 
world" (Koestler 1974: 15). Therefore, a suspicion of fraud mars the integrity and 
probity of thousands of respectable scientists. But it would be unreasonable to 
suppose the reality of a conspiracy on such a scale. Hence the fraud hypothesis 
must be dropped. 
The remark of J. B Rhine, a psychologist who led a para-psychological 
laboratory in Duke University for forty years, on the question of incompetence is 
that: "It is also probable that some errors have been made in recording, totaling 
and computing values. If so, such errors are at most of trifling consequence. 
The general ground has been covered too often and by too many individuals for 
serious error that would vitiate an important conclusion" (Rhine 1934: 154). In 
other words disbelief in the_competence of the researchers can be sustained only 
by a fanatic and unintelligent doubt. Therefore doubts based on both the fraud and 
incompetence hypotheses are deemed to be unjustified. Accordingly, they must be 
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rejected. Even here it is worth noting that the fact that a scientist vouches for his 
or her competence does not by necessity exclude the possibility of error. The claim 
to competence is not the affirmation of infallibility. 
( c) Scientific proof 
The remaining source of skepticism of the reality of "paranormal" events worth 
considering is that these events are difficult to confirm in a way that meets 
the demands of proof of science. As with the others, this claim can hardly be 
rationally defended. The statistical nature of scientific justification as the basis 
for strict replication and prediction is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for recognizing the objectivity of science (Doyal and HmTis 1986: 52-72). In 
upholding 'objectivity' science necessarily excludes certain elements and segments 
of reality from its purview. It is therefore narrow and limited in scope. Elements or 
segments of reality falling outside the scope of science are no less real because of 
their exclusion. Now, a review of PNC experiments reported since 1934 indicates 
a statistically significant replication rate of sixty one percent of approximately 3 .3 
million trials (Honorton 1978: 487). Hon01ion observes that "this is 60 times the 
number of significant studies we would expect if the significant results were due 
to chance error (Honorton 1978: ibid)". 
It is reasonable, then, to view the replication status in the findings of psychical 
research within the larger perspective of replication demands in other areas of scientific 
research. It becomes clear, when this approach is adopted, that 'paranormal' phenomena 
are not the only events in which strict replication is unfeasible. In the medical and 
behavioral sciences, the demand for strict replication is an exception to the rule (Beloff 
1994: 9). Even in contemporary theoretical physics, the ability to predict future events 
under definite circumstances seems elusive. Thus "Yes! Physics has given up. We do 
not know how to predict what will happen in a given circumstance, and we believe 
now that it is impossible - that the only thing that can be predicted is the probability of 
different events" (Feynman, Leighton, & Sands 1965: 10). Therefore, the challenge of 
non-replication may also be set aside. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the recalcitrance of the 
subscribers to physicalism must be solely because these events defy their 
explanatory framework. It remains to be seen how justified this recalcitrance is. 
Before we attend to the question of this justification, we tum to some features of 
the ontological and epistemological systems of African cultures, which do not 
fully endorse "the fundamental ideas and principles upon which modem science 
has been built", and consider how they legitimately sustain the reality and 
rationality of the "paranormal". 
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4. Foundations of the belief in the "Paranormal" in African Philosophy 
The fundamental structure of Akan cosmology and ontology is fairly well 
documented (Ajei 2000; Busia 1963; Danquah 1968; Gyekye 1995; Rattray 1927) 
and the predominant interpretation of these by traditional Akan sages, philosophers 
and anthropologists alike reveals the following three essential features: 
The first is the postulate that existence comprises visible and invisible 
realms. Secondly, Akan thought postulates a universe containing a hierarchy of 
beings, with Onyame (the Supreme Being) at the top. In descending order from 
Onyame comes the abosom (deities) the Nsamanfo (ancestral spirits) human beings 
and physical objects. Some commentators have attributed a dualistic universe to 
the Akans (Gyekye 1995: 87), assigning all the categories of being beyond human 
beings to be the immaterial/spiritual realm of existence, whereas observable 
entities like trees have been consigned to the physical realm. We would like to 
suggest here that although the Akan thinker affirms that the universe is composed 
of visible and invisible beings, it is doubtful whether the implication is that these 
aspects of existence are two distinctly separate categories as the notion of dualism 
would suggest. Rather the Akan thinker conceives of these two realms as two 
points on a continuum, and not distinct realms. This makes a clear-cut dichotomy 
of the immaterial/material or spiritual/physical in Akan ontology implausible. 
The third essential postulate of Akan cosmology is that the universe is 
endowed with varying degrees of force of power, all of which derive ultimately 
from Onyame. This force or power is sunsum, "a universal spirit, manifesting itself 
differently in the various beings and objects in the natural world" (Gyekye 1995: 
73) or "a general power to act in non-ordinary, non-physical ways" (Minkus 1977: 
115). In particular existents, sunsum itself manifests as an activating essence2• On 
this view, all existing things are similarly unified by their indispensable possession 
of sunsum, a universal force that functions as the activating principle of their 
being. The concept, then, accounts for the basic similarity of all existents, which 
are alike in being spirited or active. 
But what is meant by the claim that sunsum is a 'power' or 'force' that 
pervades the universe? Most traditional Akan sages and modem philosophers alike 
admit that sunsum, as force or power, is locatable in this world and is accessible 
to sense experience under certain conditions. It is immediately concealed from 
the senses, but the shroud that veils sunsum from immediate perception may be 
removed under certain conditions, which may be achieved by training or by the 
conscious (or unconscious) assumption of a certain mental state (Ofosu: 1999). 
As a force capable of manifesting, and influencing events, in the physical 
world, sunsum, by nature, is susceptible to the system of coordinates that define 
the spatio-temporal schema. Yet, it is not like the concepts of mainstream Western 
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philosophy and science, guided exclusively by the canons of the logic of binary 
opposition with its central principles ofldentity and Non-Contradiction. This is the 
case because this logic, primarily concerned as it is with the form rather than the 
content, of thought, is ill equipped to capture the content and all the ramifications 
of the dynamism of a concept like sunsum. 
In order for an existing thing to be active or have consciousness its sunsum 
has to interact with the energy of something else in the universe. Consequently, 
philosophers in the indigenous African setting define experience as the outcome 
of interaction of sunsum. These interactions lead to events of which we may be 
cognitively, affectively or sensorially aware, and sometimes not. The vitality of 
the sunsum possessed by the various beings on the hierarchical structure of Akan 
ontology differs, and these different levels of potency of sunsum determine the 
levels of awareness of these beings. 
If the ability to consciously experience an event depends on the vitality 
of one's sunsum, then a human being may be endowed with just sufficient sunsum 
to enable him/her consciousness only of the physical world, or some aspects ofit. 
However, this vitality may be augmented to enable a person attain 'cosmological 
consciousness', a level of conscious energy that is capable of apprehending "our 
understanding of the divine and our relationships to the divine and everything's 
relationship to everything else" (Grills 2002: 12). Cosmological consciousness, 
then, denotes the ability of a person's sunsum to maximize the use of primordial 
intelligence with which he was endowed at birth, permitting it consciousness of 
events which are not ordinarily knowable to others. 
The Akan thinker's notion of sunsum as force coincides with the notion 
of energy in Western science, conceives of energy as all that was, is and ever will 
be (i.e. something that can be neither created nor destroyed). On this view, energy 
may not be visible, but we can understand its properties to do useful tasks called 
work. The transferring of energy from one object to the other is what is meant by 
work. Therefore, work is the product of a force (F) times a distance ( d). Newton's 
First Law states that ifthere is no net force on a body, then that body must remain 
at rest if it is initially at rest. 
It is important to note two things at this juncture. First, that Western 
science has for centuries admitted as one of its most important theoretical 
postulates something (energy) that cannot be seen by our ordinary channels 
of perception, but experienced. Secondly, that an energy source can neither be 
created nor destroyed. 
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5. Wholeness and Sunsum 
Due to the belief in the existence of a universal active force that derives from 
Onyame, the Akan thinker can legitimately be held to conceive of being or nature 
as one. In this ontology, human beings, like all categories of being partake, by 
virtue of the species of sunsum in them, of the being of Onyame. Therefore, we 
cannot plausibly separate being (as matter) from being (as consciousness). Being 
is understood as being wholeness. I partake of sunsum and so does that tree. Our 
sunsum derives from one source. 
Since all the beings in a wholistic framework share characteristics of the 
various aspects of a complex whole that forms an internally contiguous order, 
holonistic ontology succeeds in harmoniously fitting the multiplicity of beings 
in a single domain of existence. Now, it is important to understand that in this 
oneness the essential relations among the diverse beings allow for such fluidity 
that the categories which define their essential attributes dovetail into each other 
(Abraham 1962: 51). What this notion of beings perpetually emanating from, and 
gravitating towards the source of their existence means is that their existence is 
merely a pattern of interactions within a wholeness that each existing entity has 
the power to interact with every other entity and, as such, is a key to universal 
knowledge. 
A holonistic conception of the universe therefore affords us a picture of 
nature as a multiplicity of entities that interact in both determinate and indeterminate 
patterns. It is a view that furnishes us with a language for describing or reasoning 
about natural and man-made phenomena in a way that both acknowledges the 
importance of logic and the limitations imposed upon its predilection for form 
rather than content. It is necessary to transcend these limitations on the ground 
that actually, matter and form are indivisible. This indivisibility speaks to the 
need to recognize the emergence of a logic consistent with it. The language of the 
indivisibility, in actu, of content and form reveals the ability of human conscious 
energy to operate simultaneously at various levels of existence, of the human 
capacity to interact with other entities in nature whose being humans cannot 
accurately define. The logic consistent with this conception may be referred to as 
the rheomode language (Ramose 1999: 56-60). In this order of things, our search 
for unity (for a definite, absolute knowledge of nature) reveals that no method of 
investigation can yield a permanent truth about nature. Instead, we are encouraged 
to recognize and to explore the interdependence of significant elements in a totality, 
and to appreciate the relevance of this to our knowledge about nature. How, then, 
are events caused in this holonistic cosmology and ontology of African thought? 
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6. Causality in a Holonistic Framework and the Justification ofth.e 
"Paranormal" 
Many African philosophers are agreed that indigenous African cultures subscribe 
to the principle of universal determinism. Thus "when a European explains an 
unpredictable or unexpected natural event by reference to chance, coincidence, 
luck, or fortune, from the point of view of Akan thinkers that is the same as saying 
that the cause is unknown. But the Akan thinker would here retort that ignorance 
of the cause of an event does not imply the non existence of a cause" (Gyekye 
1995: 82). The determinism upheld by African thinkers differs in a fundamental 
manner from that of Western philosophy and physical science. Embedded in the 
Western notion of causation is the idea that a cause (Y) must necessarily precede 
the event (X) which Y causes. There may be an intermediate chain of events 
between X and Y, but all these must progress from Y before they can properly be 
considered as part of the cause of X. 
Within the deterministic universe of Africans, however, there are two 
types of causal explanations. The first type pertains to what Gyekye describes 
as "Why 1" questions. In these, contiguous causal relations are established and 
therefore physical laws are considered relevant and sufficient to explain relations 
between phenomena. This is the same as the theory of causality upheld in Western 
philosophy and science. But where the events to be explained are considered 
extraordinary in character, such that physical laws prove inadequate to explain 
them, the investigator would resort to a "Why 2" question and its attendant 
explanatory model. By so doing, the investigator admits the limitations of the 
explanatory capacity of physical laws. And in a "Why 2" explanatory model, the 
interplay of sunsum becomes the fundamental postulate. 
This two-pronged causal theory is common across African cultures. 
Sogolo, for example, refers to this as "primary" and "secondary elaborations" 
with regard to causality in African thought (Sogolo 1993: 91-116). Writing of the 
Yoruba concept of Inner Essence, Ayoade suggests that we should not consider 
non-supernatural and supernatural questions as constituting two irreconcilable 
categories of causal theory but rather as different points along the same continuum. 
He writes "this is particularly so because the Yoruba believes that a non-
supernatural ailment makes a patient highly susceptible to, or softens up a patient 
for, the infliction of a supernatural ailment" (Ayoade 1979: 49). Ayoade's 'non-
supernatural' and 'supernatural' is coterminus with Gyekye's 'Why 1' and 'Why 
2'. Therefore in Yoruba causal theory, Gyekye's Why 1 and Why 2 types of causes 
would be complementary and mutually inclusive. It is tempting to pursue this line 
of thought with particular reference to the classical discussion on the principle of 
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sufficient reason. Leibniz is a well-known proponent of this principle (Parkinson 
1965: 56-75; Russel 1937: 30-35). Without succumbing to this temptation, we 
suggest that this principle is, on the basis of a critical discussion, amenable to the 
African conception of causality. 
From his analysis of an invented fire brought about by an arsonist, Sogolo 
affirms this view that different causal explanations may affirm and complement 
each other by advancing the view that a given event can have a variety of causal 
explanations and our interest in that event determines which of these various causes 
we advance (Sogolo 1993: 107-108). One of the suggestions to be inferred from 
this is the importance of cultural determinants in the analysis of 'cause', a position 
curiously compatible with Hume's (1975) attack on the concept of causation.3• 
Since this attack, it is now largely accepted by both philosophy and science 
that a constant conjunction between two events is sufficient to prove a 'causal 
connection' between them. This casts doubts on the legitimacy of the demands 
for an objective, value-free and universal notion of causality, especially in the 
behavioral sciences. If the explanation of an event is legitimately determined by 
my interests, then I am surely providing sufficient explanation for the event by 
claiming that X caused it so long as I observe a constant conjunction between the 
event and X. 
This integrated approach to causal analysis makes the explanation of the 
"paranormal" by African ontologies, plausible. This is because in explaining the 
events which pose anomalies and paradoxes to Western science, this approach 
proceeds from the knowledge that although physical laws make for regularity in 
the explanation of nature, they cannot exhaust all possible explanations of events. 
This is because for the African the ontology of invisible beings is as real as the 
reality of the observable physical world. The riatural laws of physicalism, which 
presuppose regularity in nature, become inadequate because such regularity is 
undermined by the existence of irregular events that also form part of human 
experience. For the Akan and, by extension the African, the cause of these latter 
events is an invisible force present in the world, sunsum. It is difficult to understand 
why physical scientists should have a problem with this, because in fact Newton's 
lifelong dissatisfaction with gravity", was because of his understanding that gravity 
was paradigmatically action at a distance, a mode of causation which seemed 
to have no place in his comprehensive system of mechanics5• In other words, 
Newtonian physics, which has shaped the theories and practice of science from 
the seventeenth century onwards admitted at least two characteristic modes of 
causality. 
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7. The activity of suns um in a holonistic framework 
The organism, then, constitutes the minimum entity of analysis in a holonistic 
framework. For, although the event, say X, may consist of parts, all these parts 
become modes in which they (the parts) enter into the composition of X. What, 
then, would be the place of sunsum in this schema? Its role would be to link the 
singular events not a unity, and this role becomes particularly evident when, for 
instance, a diviner performs an act of precognition which brings together parts of 
reality that apparently have no link. 
But how does sunsum serve this function? Ifwe grant the hypothesis that 
sunsum is a force that inheres in every existing individual as well as pervading the 
space outside individuals in the perceptible world, then it is not difficult to accept 
that the sunsum dwelling in a particular existent is capable of escaping its spatial 
localization and regain its membership of the universal sunsum. The localized 
sunsum ~s only a species of a universal phenomenon. In a holonistic conception 
of nature, the activity of sunsum can provide us with a meaningful explanation of 
precognition because the structure of space and time in this conception is different 
from the physical-scientific conception ofit. The potency of the diviner's psychic 
power (his personal sunsum) enables him to collapse the barriers erected in our 
consciousness by our fixed conception of space and time that normally serve as 
indispensable coordinates for our understanding of events. By this collapse of 
space and time, the diviner's personal sunsum becomes a receiver in the present 
of events 'transmitted' from the future. Sunsum as energy is the medium of 
this transmission. The potent psychic energy of the diviner (personal sunsum) 
apprehends the future event through the medium of universal sunsum which 
pervades space and time. It is because of the wholeness that universal sunsum 
can serve as the vehicle through which 'the whole situation' can be grasped by a 
potent personal sunsum. For the diviner, therefore, something unknowable in the 
physical scientific framework - the future - becomes actually known because the 
barrier (time) that shields the future away from the present is removed. Through 
the sunsum the "supernatural" is one with the natural world. In this connection it 
is necessary to inquire why telepathy and fortune telling seem to be so popular in 
the West despite its skepticism about the "paranormal". Furthermore, the oneness 
of the universe, according to Akan cosmology, raises the interesting question of 
whether or not African philosophy has only an ontology and, not an ontology and 
a metaphysics. It is outside the scope of this paper to consider this question. 
The sunsum that pervades space outside of individuals provide a link 
by which individuals can be connected, although they may themselves inhabit 
a different location in space. This link may be contiguous, but because sunsum 
is inaccessible to ordinary sense, our normal perceptive channels are unable to 
Martin Ajei 33 
apprehend this contiguity. It is in this connection that sunsum explains adequately 
the "paranonnal" events and substantiates its presence in our human sensible 
dimensions of space and time. 
8. Empirical justification for the occurrence of the paranormal outside 
of the experimental setting 
The hypothesis of sunsum as an active cause of phenomena has an empirical basis 
in the sense that its proponents regard the occurrence of these phenomena to be 
adequately established either by observation or testimonial evidence (Engmann 
1992: 186). Our interaction with thinkers in the traditional setting also confirms 
their willingness to relate theory to facts, in the sense that they infer the existence 
of the hypothesized force from concrete manifestations that they attribute to it, 
and consider these manifestations sufficient reason for their inference. 
Oluwole argues for the validity of this inference by contending .that the 
positive result of any one of the following would be sufficient to establish the 
reality of witchcraft: 
i) we may be given an explanation of the modus operandi of witchcraft 
power 
ii) we may experimentally establish a causal relationship between the 
postulated paranormal power and the event that proves the practical 
efficacy of this power 
iii) we may show a practical manipulation of the power (Oluwole 1995: 
367) 
Oluwole then submits that the African's claim to the rationality of her belief in the 
reality of "paranormal" forces rests in her ability to infer their activity by virtue 
of (ii) and (iii) above. Thus the African establishes certain facts as the effects of 
something (a force) whose existence may not be denied precisely because of those 
facts and, on the basis of African ontology, inferssunsum as the cause of those facts. 
This inference is strengthened by his/her knowledge of the abundant testimony to 
the apparent ability of diviners and sangomas to control and manipulate these 
powers. On this view, then, the African's belief in the "paranormal" explains 
witchcraft. The explanation boils down to a statement about the demonstrable 
effects of this belief in practice. 
The rationality of the belief in sunsum as a theoretical positum on the 
basis of an ontology is well within the purview of scientific practice. In fact purely 
objective knowledge, if by that is meant knowledge in which metaphysics - though 
from an African philosophical standpoint ontology of invisible beings is preferred 
to metaphysics - does not play a part, cannot exist. A "metaphysics" and values 
are necessarily prior and foundational to every science, conceived as a body of 
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knowledge and practice6• Two special and striking cases of the profound influence 
of"metaphysics" on the pursuit of science in the Western experience deserve brief 
mention here. 
The first is that Locke's metaphysical doctrine of primary and secondary 
qualities7 provided the basis for Newtonian physics (Mackie 1976: 22-23). The 
second is Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity, the metaphysical foundation 
of which is the claim that any system of objects has equal title to the claim to 
be 'absolutely at rest' and hence any of them can be chosen as the frame of 
reference by which the motions of all other systems are determined (Harre 1972: 
15-16). Consequently, the legitimate ideals of objectivity are better achieved 
by understanding that when particular theories and assumptions prove to be a 
bar to progress in understanding the nature of the world, they are liable to be 
changed or improved. Thus "the assumption underlying the current requirements 
of empirical verification [by Western Science], the assumption that information 
can be transmitted and received by human beings only through the recognized 
channels of the senses, is subject to amendment in the future" (Oluwole 1995: 
368). It is not insignificant that Burtt (1932) has traversed this territory through 
his historical and critical essay under the title, The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Physical Science. 
9. The Endorsement of"Paranormal" Cognition by the Causal Theory 
of Knowledge 
Plato's account of knowledge in his Thaetetus was widely accepted as sufficient in 
the Western philosophical setting until it was challenged by Gertier, who provided 
examples to show that the justification principle in Platonic epistemology could 
produce a situation in which a false belief is (or can be) justified (Gettier 1963: 
122-123). The problems posed by Gettier inspired a set of approaches to the 
analysis of knowledge, one of which is the Causal Theory which, we believe, 
affords a means by which "paranormal" cognition could be validated. 
The idea underlying all the various formulations of the Causal Theory 
is that the justification condition for knowledge is met if one's belief is caused 
in an appropriate way (Appiah 1989: 52). But what precisely is appropriate, and 
how do we decide on that? A widely acclaimed interpretation of "the appropriate 
way" of getting a true belief is to be able to distinguish the actual state of affairs in 
which the belief is true from relevant possible states of affairs in which the belief 
is false. This discrimination of the actually true from the possibly false state of 
affairs is best done by a method that is reliable in the circumstances (Goldman 
1978: 124). 
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A few perspectives emerge from Goldman's rendition of the justification 
condition that supports our claim that Causal Theories validate "paranormal" 
cognition. The first is the suggestion that a reliable method for distinguishing true 
beliefs varies with the circumstances. This means simply that what constitutes 
good evidence for a true belief is relative to the state of affairs prevalent in 
the belief situation. Since a reliable method justifies a belief, according to the 
Causal Theory, and since much in the foregone supports the claim that belief in 
"paranormal" cognition can be shown to be based on 'a reliable method', then 
belief in "paranormal" cognition is rationally validated by the Causal Theory. 
10. The African Diviner as a challenge to "science" 
The validation of "paranormal" events by a theory in mainstream Western 
epistemology and science leads us to develop the argument, advanced earlier on 
in this paper, that on the basis of developments in some branches of mainstream 
Western science, the African holonistic practitioner of the "paranormal", who 
identifies, accesses and harnesses the potency of sunsum for action in the world, 
can share the status of' scientist' in a redefined concept of science. 
The dominating note of science until the beginning of the 201h century 
appears to be that the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism affords an adequate 
basis for scientific concepts. Many complexities have developed in respect of the 
fundamental concepts of science such as matter, space, time and energy. These 
have undermined the assumptions ofphysicalism. The result is that it can no longer 
hold. Consequently, its relevance to scientific knowledge has been profoundly 
diminished. 
The factors that first led physicists to distrust their orthodox faith were 
two theoretical systems developed between 1900 and 1927. One was quantum 
theory, dealing with fundamental units of matter and energy, and the other was the 
Theory of Relativity, that deals with space, time and the structure of the universe 
as a whole. Both of these theories are now accepted pillars of contemporary 
scientific thought. We propose to concentrate on quantum theory here because 
its findings provide better analogies between the foundations of the theories and 
methods of the practitioners of the "paranormal" and contemporary physicists. 
At the heart of quantum theory is the denial that an atom really exists as an 
independent entity (Davies 1990: 72-90). Ifit does, then at the very least it should 
have a location and a definite motion in space at all times, and this should apply 
to its components as well. But the findings of Quantum Theorists suggest that it 
is impossible to know simultaneously the velocity and the position of an electron 
orbiting around an atomic nucleus (Sklar 1992: 164-179). This is the celebrated 
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Principle of Uncertainty, formulated by Heisenberg, one of the founders of this 
theory (Heisenberg 1962: 44-45). It states simply that it is impossible with any of 
the principles now known to science to determine the position and the velocity of 
an electron at the same time - to state confidently that an electron is "right here at 
this spot" and is moving at such and such a speed". This is because micro particles 
have been observed to traverse their path in space discontinuously: they move to 
other parts in space only by disappearing and then reappearing at a new location: 
they change location by "quantumjumps" (Powers 1982: 138-152). 
The implications of this principle for us are these: (i) if there exists no 
exact state of the particle, the idea that a real thing is that which can be located at 
a certain place at a certain time is questionable and, with it, the classical notion of 
causality. (ii) If all explanations and predictions of micro phenomena can only be 
indeterminate, and it is these micro phenomena that are the ultimate constituents 
of macro phenomena, then the cause of events and phenomena at the macro level 
must be indeterminate as well. Where then do we stand with regard to the classical 
notion of causality? 
To give meaning to the wave-like and particle-like representations of 
nature, Niels Bohr proposed another principle: the Principle of Complementarity, 
which states that the particle picture and the wave picture are two complementary 
descriptions of the same reality, each of them only partially correct and only within 
a limited range of application. For a full account of reality both viewpoints are 
needed, even though they are incompatible and cannot be viewed simultaneously 
(Akyeampong 1993: 20-21). 
What this principle seems to suggest, then, is that the metaphysical 
barrier that separates the human observer from 'objective reality' has become 
obscure. Further, it supports the view that there exist phenomena in nature which 
cannot be explained or understood with the current methods of science: since 
this principle rejects the notion that a particular explanatory framework can be 
absolutely dependable, it establishes, by implication, the necessary limitation of 
the insights of physicalism. It seems to advocate a complementary and inclusive 
approach to the study of reality, affirming the perspective that the cumulative yield 
of several points of view will produce a better understanding of reality than any 
single framework of knowledge. 
Both the Complementarity and Uncertainty Principles substantiate the 
plausibility of our elucidation of the concept of sunsum. We maintain that a 
particular sunsum is a species of the universal sunsum, and that for this reason it is 
capable of transcending our normal conceptions of space and time. Furthermore, 
the Uncertainty Principle invalidates the classical notion of causality since the 
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location of the causes of events in the micro world cannot be completely determined. 
Similarly, the African cosmologist postulates a causal element (sunsum) whose 
location and mechanisms are indeterminate. 
Thus at the dawn of the 21st century, a new scientific worldview has 
emerged in which the objectivity of the natural world has been replaced by the 
view that the behavior of the object under investigation changes as we change our 
point of view. The present scientific worldview, especially the Complementarity 
Principle, seems to agree with the notion that there are several mutually exclusive 
approaches to reality. It confirms the view that there are phenomena or experiences 
in nature that cannot be understood or explained with the methodology of 
physicalism alone. 
11. Conclusion 
We have shown that the principle of causality in Western science remains 
responsible for the exclusion of the "paranormal" from the purview of science. Yet, 
the principle of causality is itself seriously vitiated by Heisenberg's indete1minacy 
principle on the one hand and Bohr's complementarity principle on the other. 
Accordingly, the weak foundation upon which the principle of causality rests 
cannot be definitive justification or denial of the "paranormal". On this basis, the 
Akan concept of sunsum having strong conceptual and cultural affinity with moya, 
moea, umoya (Ramose 1999: 85) in the Bantu languages, has been invoked in 
support of the thesis that the unduly narrow and restrictive concept of science 
upheld by the West must be broadened in order to sustain its claim to science. 
Such broadening must also mean the recognition of sunsum and other closely 
related African concepts as scientifically viable. Without such recognition both 
the credibility and the tenability of Western science shall remain in doubt from the 
point of view of African indigenous knowledge systems. 
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NOTES 
1. This is exemplified by the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research in 
London in 1882 
2. This is affirmed by both Gyekye, (1995: 72) and Minkus, (1977: 114). What this 
means is that the universe of traditional Akan thought contains no inert objects in the 
sense of matter incapable of awareness or action. This notion that every existent is 
composed of an activating principle constitutes a difference between the metaphysic 
of the Akans and other metaphysical systems. It rejects by implication Cartesianism 
and other all metaphysical systems that hold that matter is essentially passive or inert 
and that a creative divine being must therefore activate it 
3. In his Enquiries, Hume argues that the physical existence of causal necessity is 
demonstrable neither on purely rational nor empirical grounds. This, according to 
Hume, is the case since no logical contradiction is involved in assuming that the 
relevant correlation between 'cause' and 'effect' will cease to occur: "when we look 
about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never 
able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection; any quality 
which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence 
of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The 
impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole 
that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression 
form this succession of objects: consequently, there is not in any single, particular 
instance of cause and effect, anything which can suggest the idea of power or 
necessary connection." (p. 63) 
4. In his Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy, Newton was at pains to explain 
that he did not consider gravity to be a primary power of matter since it acted at a 
distance. 
5. Newton's laws of impact describe the redistribution of velocities and changes in 
direction that takes place when two or more things collide. This is the very essence 
of Action by Contact. 
6. This claim alludes to Kuhn's (1970) subsuming of all scientific activity under 
a paradigm. And a paradigm, according to him, consists of all the theoretical and 
methodological assumptions and operations which operate under a period of 'normal 
science' during which scientists do not disagree about their conclusions once they 
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are derived and tested from within the prevailing paradigm. The claim can also be 
attributed to Mudimbe, 1988; Harding, 1997; and Ramose, 2002. 
7. According to which certain qualities of bodies were held to be known to us in sensory 
experience while others manifest in the things themselves. 
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